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N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES KINNE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Case No. 
16447 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a review of the Findings and Order entered 
by the Industrial Commission of Utah on February 23, 1979 
and Supplemental Order dated March 27, 1979 in the matter 
of Susan Wynn, Widow of Max L. Wynn, deceased, vs. Freeport 
Transport, Inc., State Insurance Fund and Charles Kinne. 
DISPOSITION OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Industrial Commission entered a finding that 
the decedent, May L. Wynn, was in the course of his 
employment at the time of his death and by Supplemental 
Order held that the decedent was an employee of the plaintiff. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
The plaintiff requests this Court to set aside 
the finding of the Industrial Commission and the award 
made on the grounds that the facts do not support the 
award. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 12, 1976, Charles W. Kinne 
entered into an Agreement with Freeport Transport, 
Inc. whereby Kinne would lease his tractor to Freeport 
for their use and benefit. (R321-328) The Agreement 
defined Freeport as Carrier and Kinne as Contractor. 
The pertinent parts of the Agreement provide: 
"During the entire term hereof, the 
sole possession, responsibility for 
and control and direction of the 
vehicular equipment described above 
and the drivers thereof, whether 
employees of Contractor or Carrier, 
shall reside in Carrie~." (R322) 
"Contractor shall be solely 
responsible for the direction and 
control of employees, agents and 
servants of Contractor, including 
selecting, hiring, supervising, 
directing, setting wages, hours and 
working conditions, and paying and 
adjusting grievances of the 
employees." (R323) 
"No other provisions of this Agreement 
shall be interpreted or construed 
as creating or establishing the 
relationship of employer and employee 
between Carrier and Contractor or any 
driver, agent, servant, or any other 
employee of Contractor." (R324) 
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"Contractor shall maintain workmans 
compensation coverage for all 
employees, agents or servants 
employed by the Contractor in the 
performance of this contract." (R326) 
"Proof of such coverage (workmans 
compensation) as is required by this 
paragraph and notice to Carrier of 
cancellations thereof shall be 
submitted to Contractor by Carrier." 
(R326) 
"Carrier assumes liability for bodily 
injuries to or the death of any person 
other than Contractor, the employees, 
agents or servants of Contractor 
resulting from the negligent operation, 
maintenance or use of the vehicle 
described herein." (R325) 
"Carrier shall maintain insurance for 
the aforesaid liabilities, injuries, 
losses or damages as required by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and the 
State and other governmental 
authorities." (R326) 
Kinne failed to get workmans compensation coverage 
and Freeport Transport, Inc. failed to require proof of the 
workmans compensation coverage as required by the Lease 
Agreement. (R232) 
Approximately the last part of October, Max L. Nynn, 
a theretofore unemployed truck driver, found a job 
answering an advertisement for A & K Railroad Materials-
who referred him to Mr. Kinne. (R52) 
The application of employment came from A & K 
Railroad Materials. (R54) A & K Railroad Materials and 
Freeport Transport, Inc. have common stockholders and 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
share space in the same building at Freeport Center. 
(R80) Mr. Wynn had to pass a road test and written test 
administered by Freeport Transport, Inc. in order to 
become employed. (R56-58) Freeport Transport, Inc. made 
sure all drivers took the physical required by the 
Department of Transporation. Freeport Transport, Inc. 
required the drivers to call each day so they could 
schedule their freight. (R60) Freeport Transport, Inc. 
administered all the record keeping required by the 
Department of Transportation as it referred to the 
records kept by the drivers. (R78) All trip envelopes 
and supplies were furnished by Freeport Transport, Inc. 
to the drivers. (RlOl) Signs were placed on the sides 
of the tractor indicating it was engaged in the business 
of Freeport Transport, Inc. (R258) All safety standards 
for drivers and equipment were administered and controlled 
by Freeport Transport, Inc. (R87) If problems arose will 
the driver refusing to take loads or failing to perform 
in a manner satisfactory to Freeport Transport, Inc., 
they would request di&ciplinary action by Mr. Kinne and 
on at least one occasion at the request of Freeport, 
Mr. Kinne discharged one of his drivers for failing to 
perform in a satisfactory manner. (R89, 90, 143, 221) 
Freeport Transport, Inc. was the ICC carrier and 
ultimately responsible to the ICC for their drivers. (R81) 
-4-
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On November 9, 1976, Max L. Wynn picked up his 
load at Paonia, Colorado and arrived in Price, Utah at 
1:00 p.rn. This was a Tuesday. On November 10, 1976, 
he drove from Price and arrived at Clearfield 
approximately 10:00 a.m. (R91-93) The nature of 
Mr. Wynn's load prevented him from driving at night or 
on weekends or holidays and there was some indication 
that there may have been a holiday corning up in Nevada 
on the following Thursday or Friday. It took Mr. Wynn 
eight hours of driving to get from Paonia, Colorado to 
Clearfield, Utah which computed out to an average fifty 
miles per hour rate of travel. His ultimate destination. 
was Milpitas, California which could have been driven in. 
an additional sixteen hours traveling at fifty miles 
per hour. (R91-96) Mr. Wynn decided to return to 
Clearfield rather than proceed directly to California. 
During the next couple of days he ran shag loads for 
Freeport Transport, Inc. and was then instructed to 
proceed to California the next Monday, November 15~ 1976. 
(R295-298) 
There was no requirement, either by Charles Kinne 
or Freeport Transport, Inc., that Mr. Wynn take his 
tractor home. (R37, 134, 187, 217) On at least one 
occasion, his wife had taken him to Freeport Transport, 
Inc. to start a trip. (R37) On this particular occasion, 
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he took the tractor home and on November 15, 1976, 
while proceeding towards Freeport Transport, Inc. to 
start the completion of his trip to California, he 
drove around a crossing guard at a railroad track and 
was struck by a train and killed. (R201-202) 
The widow of Max L. Wynn, Susan Wynn, filed 
her claim for workmans compensation benefits naming 
Freeport Transport, Inc., Charles Kinne and the State 
Insurance Fund as defendants. The State Insurance Fund 
was the insurer of Freeport Transport, Inc. Charles 
Kinne had no workmans compensation insurance. The 
matter was heard on October 5, 1977 before the 
Honorable Joseph C. Foley. 
On July 25, 1978, Joseph C. Foley, the 
Administrative Law Judge, entered his Findings and 
Conclusions. In the Findings Joseph Foley stated: 
"Max L. Wynn was a statutory employee of Freeport 
Transport, Inc. and not of Charles Kinne by virtue of 
the· amount of control and direction provided to 
Freeport Transport~ Inc~ in the Lease Agreement entered 
into by Charles Kinne and Freeport Transport, Inc." (R404) 
As a conclusion of law, Judge Foley held that Max L. Wynn 
was not in the scope and course of his employment at 
the time of his fatal accident and compensation benefits 
were therefore denied. (R404) 
-6-
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Thereafter, the widow filed a Motion for Review 
and on February 23, 1979 the Industrial Commission 
granted the Motion. (R438) The Commission, although 
not specifically deciding that Max L. Wynn was not the 
employee of Charles Kinne, implied that they were 
concurring in the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
that he was only the employee of Freeport Transport, 
Inc. The Commission further held that Mr. Wynn was in 
the course of his employment at the time of his fatal 
accident and the 0idow was therefore entitled to 
benefits. By letter dated March 19, 1979, the lawyer 
representing the State Insurance Fund requested the 
Commission to clarify its Order as to whether or not 
there was any joint liability of Charles.Kinne with 
the statutory employer, State Insurance Fund, for the 
payment of benefits. (R448) 
By Supplemental Order dated March 27, 1979, 
the Commission held that Max L. Wynn was the employee 
of Charles Kinne pursuant to the Lease Agreement and, 
therefore, Charles Kinne was jointly and severally 
liable for the compensation award to the widow. (R450) 
On April 6, 1979 Charles Kinne objected to the 
Supplemental Order and requested further review which 
was denied on April 18, 1979. (R453-456) 
-7-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MAX L. WYNN WAS OUTSIDE THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT CAUSING HIS DEATH. 
The evidence at the hearing established that 
there was no requirement for Mr. Wynn to use the 
tractor to go to and from work. He would occasionally 
take it home for the purpose of servicing the tractor, 
but there was no requirement, either from Freeport 
Transport, Inc. or Charles Kinne, that he keep the truck 
at his home. There was adequate space at Freeport Transport 
Inc. to park the truck and keep it when it was not in use. 
It is clear that Mr. Wynn's election to go to Clearfield 
rather than to drive on to California which was his 
ultimate destination was his own choice and not at the 
direction of or for the benefit of his employer. It 
was well established that Mr. Wynn had sufficient time, 
even assuming there may have been a holiday in Nevada, 
to deliver his load to Milpitas, California by Friday 
evening. 
In Barney v. Industrial Commission, 550 P. 2d 
1271 (1973), the deceased was a bricklayer who was killed 
in an automobile accident while returning home from work. 
He lived more than sixty miles from the job site and 
pursuant to the agreement with his employer, was paid 
-81 
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an additional $1.75 per hour for traveling time when 
his job was more than sixty miles from his labor union 
temple. 
The Court held that since the employer had no 
control over where the deceased lived or how he g·ot to 
work, he was deemed not to be in the course of his 
employment while going to and from the premises where 
he was employed. Barney can only be distinguished from 
the present case by the fact that the decedent, 
Max L. Wynn, was driving Charles Kinne's tractor at 
the time of his death. The election to drive the 
tractor by Mr. Wynn was his own since there was no 
requirement that he do so. 
In Greer v. Industrial Commission, 290 P. 900, 
it was established that an employee going home from his 
place of employment and not on any special mission for 
his employer was not in the· course of his employment at 
the time of his accident. The Court stated that the 
fact the employee was carrying a saw belonging to the 
employer which was hi& duty to keep sharp was only 
incidental. 
In the present case, the fact that Mr. Wynn 
happened to be in the tractor as opposed to his own 
personal transportation was also incidental and not . 
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for the benefit of his employer. 
The three cases cited by the applicant in her 
Motion for Review are all distinguishable from the 
present case. In Bailey v. Industrial Commission, 
398 P. 2d 545 (1965), it was the decedent's regular and 
definite duty to take the vehicle to his work each 
morning. Mr. Wynn, on the other hand, had no definite 
duty to take the vehicle home. 
In Mosher v. Industrial Commission, 440 P. 2d 
23 (1968)·, Mosher was injured while carrying out specific 
instructions from his employer as to how he should start 
the truck. It was the carrying out of these instructions 
from his employer that subsequently caused his burns and 
disability. -The de~edent, Max L. Wynn, was under no 
instructions to drive the truck and specifically was 
under no instructions to drive around a railroad crossing 
guard in a negligent fashion which subsequently resulted 
in his death. 
In Hafers, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 526 
P. 2d 1188, the employee was injured while working on an 
automobile assigned to him and whose definite duties 
included keeping the automobile in a safe and efficient 
condition. The plaintiff agrees that had Mr. Wynn been 
injured while working on the tractor, he would have been 
-10-
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in the course of his employment, but that is not the 
fact situation and is clearly distinguishable. 
POINT II 
MAX L. WYNN WAS NOT A STATUTORY EMPLOYEE OF CHARLES KINNE 
AND CHARLES KINNE THEREFORE HAS NO JOINT LIABILITY FOR 
WORKMANS COMPENSATION. 
No appeal has been filed by Freeport Transport, 
Inc. or the State Insurance Fund contesting the finding 
that Max L. Wynn was the statutory employee of Freeport 
Transport, Inc. The Supplemental Order entered by the 
Industrial Commission on March 27, 1979 imposed joint and 
several liability on Charles Kinne. The pertinent 
language states: 
"We also find that the Lease Agreement 
made Mr. Charles Kinne the decedent's 
employer and although not exercised, 
he did have the right of control over 
the drivers enough, we conclude, to 
have made Mr. Wynn an employee of 
Mr. Kinne. We therefore conclude that 
the decedent was statutorily employed 
by Freeport Transport, Inc. and was 
also an employee of Mr. Kinne pursuant 
to the Lease Agreement which also 
required that Mr. Kinne carry wor.kmans 
compensation coverage for his drivers." 
It is submitted that the Commission has exceeded its 
powers ~Y imposing compensation liability on Charles Kinne 
through interpretation of a contract between Charles Kinne 
and Freeport Transport, Inc. It has clearly been found 
and held that all of the pertinent aspects of control 
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were exclusively those of Freeport Transport, Inc. 
Most of the cases cited in Charles Kinne's 
original Memorandum to the Commission involved similar 
lease arrangements as the one used by Kinne and 
Freeport. ~n each of the cases, the interstate 
carrier was considered the sole responsible employer 
for purposes of workmans compensation and no joint or 
several liability was imposed upon the middleman in 
the lease arrangement. 
In Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. 
Major, 226 N .E. 2d 74 (-Ill. 1967) , the Court considered 
a similar issue involving the workmans compensation 
liability of Major to drivers of leased trucks under a 
similar lease arrangement. 
Major claimed they were not employees because 
they could make deliveries by any route they chose; they 
could hire other persons to drive their trucks; they 
could trip lease to other carriers; they were required 
to pay for repairs, gasoline, oil, tires, equipment and 
licenses; they were paid by the job not on a time basis; 
they did not receive a payroll check; they paid the 
collision insurance on their vehicles; and Major did not 
withhold any income tax from the money which he paid to 
them. 
-12-
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The Court held they were employees on two bases. 
First was the common law basis to determine whether one 
is an employer or an independent contractor. The Court 
found the language of the lease was equivalent to a 
provision that Major had a right to fire the drivers; 
that Major in fact did threaten to withhold drivers' 
checks; Major.did require the drivers to show how their 
time was spent while on trips; that the drivers could 
not trip lease without first calling the office; that 
they could not take a load from a certain dispatch point 
without first being dispatched by the office; that they 
were not to directly call shippers in one area; and that 
Major told them where to load and unload. The Court, 
applying the standard "Right to Control" test, determined 
that the drivers in question were employees of Major. 
The Court went on to hold: "We find the trial 
Court was correct in its decision for another and more 
cogent reason -- that Major was a_motor. carrier of goods 
in interstate commerce operating under authority of a 
certificate of license issued by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission." The Court went on quoting from §304(e) of 
Title 49, united s~ates Code Annotated, and from 49 
C.F.R. 1057, both of which require that all leases 
provide for exclusive possession, control and use of 
-13-
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the equipment and for complete assumption of 
responsibility in respect thereto. 
The Court quotes from the holding of the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina in Brown v. L. H. 
Bottoms Truck Lines, 117 N.C. 299, 42 S.E. 2d 71, wherein 
the Court said at page 75: 
"The transportation of goods in 
interstate commerce by motor vehicles 
was required to be under the rules 
and regulations of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the Brown 
truck could only have been used in 
such transportation by the defendant 
franchise carrier as one of its fleet 
of trucks under its license plates. 
Hence, it would seem to follow that 
control of the operation for the 
period of the lease was given to the 
licensed carrier, and that the owner 
driven truck was in contemplation of 
law in its employ and the driver for 
the trip stood in the relationship 
of its employee, as found by the 
Industrial Commission." 
"We think the applicable rule, under 
the facts here presented, is that 
the lease or contract by which the 
equipment of the authorized interstate 
carrier was augmented, must be 
interpreted as carrying the necessary 
implication that possession and control 
of the added vehicle was, for the trip, 
vested in the authorized operator." 
In Proctor v. Colonial Refrigerated Transportatio~ 
Inc., 494 F. 2d 89 (Fourth Cir. 1974), the plaintiff 
sustained serious injuries in an accident while riding 
-14-
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as a passenger in a tractor-trailer being driven by 
E. O. Bales, the owner-lessor of said equipment, to 
the defendant Colonial. Colonial was a certified 
interstate motor carrier and the plaintiff was hired 
by Bales, the owner-lessor, as an assistant driver. 
The issue was stated by the Court as follows: 
"The primary issue upon this appeal 
is whether a motor carrier operating 
under a certificate from the 
Interstate Commerce Commission is 
liable to an employee of a lessor 
for injuries resulting from the 
negligence of the lessor in the 
operation of his equipment in the 
business of the lessee-carrier." 
The Court's holding was as follows: 
"As a certified interestate carrier 
Colonial was subject to the 
supervision and con~rol of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, 
and in augmenting its equipment 
through the lease agreement with 
Bales, it was required to be in 
compliance with the Commission's 
regulations, 49 C.F.R. §1057.1-
1057.6. These regulations and 
the statute under which they were 
promulgated require and provide 
that under such lease arrangements 
the lessee-carriers "will have full 
direction and control of such 
[leased] vehicles and will be fully 
responsible for.the operation 
thereof . . . as if they were the 
owners of such vehicles . . 
These regulations were promulgated 
by the Commission to correct 
widespread abuses incident to the 
use of leased equipment by the 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
carriers, see American Truckin_g 
Association v. United States, 
3 4 4 U . S . 2 9 8 , 3 0 3 , 7 3 S . Ct . 3 O 7 , 
97 L. Ed. 337 (1953) , and the 
"intent [of the regulations] was 
to make sure that licensed 
carriers would be responsible in 
fact, as well as in law, for the 
maintenance of leased equipment 
and the supervision of borrowed 
drivers." Alford v. Major, 470 
F. 2d 132, 135 (7 Cir. 1972). 
The statute and regulatory 
pattern clearly eliminates the 
independent contractor concept 
from such lease arrangements and 
casts upon Colonial full 
responsiblity for the negligence 
of Bales as driver of the leased 
equipment. Any language to the 
contrary in the lease agreement 
would be violative of the spirit 
and letter of the Federal 
regulations and therefore 
unenforceable . 
CONCLUSION 
It is respctfully submitted that Max L. Wynn 
was outside the cour~e of his employment at the time 
of his fatal accident and that the decision to return 
to Clearfield rather than proceed directly to 
California was not to the benefit of his employer and 
should not be imposed upon Charles Kinne. It is 
further submitted that Charles Kinne statutorily was 
not the employer of Max L. Wynn and therefore has no 
liability. _ '>6__ 
DATED this ~day of June, 1979. 
Attorney 
1 ,-
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